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INTRODUCTION.
A witness is a person who has knowledge of an event, and is a
means or instrument of evidence, i.e. of unwritten or oral evidence;
his function is to inform the tribunal or officer before whom he
testifies as to matters of fact. Obviously, in order to exercise
this important function, the proposed witness must possess certain
qualifications, or in other words, he must not labor under certain
disqualifications, which will be considered in the following chap-
ters, or he will be rejected by the court or magistrate as an in-
competent witness, and his testimony excluded.
The chief reason for the exclusion of the testimony of a par-
ticular witness is, that it would, if admitted, tend to mislead
the jury, while in another great class of cases it is to protect
the witness. Witnesses in court were always put upon oath and
accordingly, were always required to have that amount of maturity,
sense, and religious belief which the act of swearing presupposes.
The rule upon this subject is that all persons offered as wit-
nesses are presumed to be competent until the contrary is affirma-
tively shown to the satisfaction of the presiding judge or magis-
trate, by whom all questions of competency are to be determined,
and who, for the purpose may examine the witness himself, or hear
any other legal testimony which may be produced upon the subject.(a)
(a) Best Ev., Sec. 133; Ste. Dig. Art. 106.
The following is an application of this rule in justice courts
which is our most inferior tribunal. "An objection to the com-
petency of a witness must be tried and determined by the justice.
Where the ground of objection depends upon a matter of fact,
evidence may be given thereupon, as upon any other question of
fact; except that, if the witness is examined thereupon by the
party objecting, no other testimony shall be received from either
party as to his competency". (a)
Objections to the competency of a witness should be made be-
fore he is examined in chief, if the disqualification be then
known to the party objecting, or if it be not then known, it must
be made as soon as the disqualification appears: for a party who,
knowing of the fact of incompetency and holds it back until after
the witness has been examined, will ordinarily be held to have
waived the objection, but if the testimony is in before the fact
of inoompetenoy is known, such evidence may be stricken out if the
party objecting uses due diligence, and makes his objection
promptly upon becoming informed of such incompetency.
(a) Code Civil Pro. 3005.

CHAPTER I.
COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES.
At Common Law.- Upon the competency of witnesses, the comnmon
law proceeded in distrust of human nature; it believed a witnerss,
if interested to be incapable of verity, and there consequently
grew up under it a system of restriction which rarely, if ever,
allowed the facts in a given case to come out fully. It was
thought, that in judicial investigations, the motives to prevent
the truth and to perpetuate falsehood, and fraud was so generally
multiplied, that if statements were received with the same undis-
crininating freedom as in private life, the ends of justice could
with far less certainty be attained, that the testimony of a wit-
ness unworthy of credit might receive as such consideration as
that of one worthy of the fullest confidence. If no means were
employed to exclude this influence from the fountains of Justice
this evil would constantly occur, the danger was always felt, and
guarded against in all civilized countries. It wan) thought
necessary to the end of Justioe that certain kinds of evidence
should be uniformnly excluded.
In determining what evidence should be admitted and weighed
by the Jury, and what not to be received at all, a principle was
applied, based upon the experienced connection between the
situation of the witness, and the truth or falsity of his testimony.
Thus, the law excluded as incompetent those persons whose evidence
in general was found most likely to mislead jurits. The question
was not whether any rule of exclusion might not sometimes shut out
credible testimony; but whether it is expedient that there should
be any rule of exclusion at all. There had to be, to carry out
this idea, some rule designating the class of evidence to be
excluded, and to this end the common law merely followed the ex-
perience of mankind.
Who is .disgialfied.- At common law the disqualifications
which rendered a witness incompetent to give any evidence at all
were: (1) the position of the proposed witness as a party to the
controversy under investigation; (2) insufficient understanding;
(3) insensible to the obligation of an oath; (4) infamy arising
from conviction of crime; (5) persons whose pecuniary interest in
the event of the matter in issue is directly involved, no matter
how trifling. (a)
Modern view.- The comon law rules, thus established,was
often the occasion of great hardships and injustice, the objections
to such a system were too manifest to escape attention. Many
though the attainment of truth would be best promoted by opening
every source of information in a given case, and that all persons
cognizant of any facts bearing upon the case, and especially those
ordinarily most conversant with them, the parties themselves,
should be permitted to speak. They expressed confidence in man
and a belief in the existance in human integrity.
From such a bases of thought there sprang up, about the middle
of this century, in many of the states, radical changes in the
--------------------------------------
(a) 1 Phill. Ev. (4 Am ed) 7; 1 Greenl. Ev. Sec.326.
admissibility and competency of persons as witnesses. A new
system has developed itself, whose foundations are laid in cormon
since, and an enlightened policy; and its superiority over the old
is no longer questioned, except by the few who have no confidence
in the present, no hope In the future, and who deem our only
liberty is in keeping fast afehored to the past. (a)
Statutes have been passed in England, and in nearly all of
the United States, which have entirely swept away some of these
radical rules of exclusion, and greatly oircumscribed and limited
the application of those that remain, as a part of ow law of
evidence. The enabling statutes relate generally to the persons
included in classes (1) & (5) of the preceding paragraph, to wit
parties to the suit and persons whose pecuniary interest is
directly involved in the matter in issue. Persons rendered in-
competent at oiwmion law by conviction of infames crime have also
been rendered competent by statute in many states, this conviction
now going to the credibility of the witness, and not to his
coupetency, still further those who formerly were inconpetent from
lack of sufficient religious belief are now rendered competent.
As though a piece of work as any is the statute of Massachusetts,
which may be taken as a type of the modern view of the subject,
it is as follows: No person of sufficient understanding, whether
a party or otherwise, shall be excluded from giving evidence as a
witness in any prooeeding, civil or criminal, in court, or before
(a) Marsh v. Potter, 30 Barb. 506.
a person having authority to receive evidence, except in the.
following cases:
wFirst. Neither husband nor wife shall be allowed to testify
as to private conversations with each other.
"Second. Neither husband nor wife shall be compelled to be a
witness on any trial upon any indictment, complaint, or other
criminal proceeding against the other.
"Third. In the trial of all indictments, complaints, and
other proceedings against persons charged with the commission of
crimes or offences, a person so charged shall, at his own request,
but not otherwise, be deemed a competent witness; and his neglect
or refusal to testify shall not create any presumption against him.u
(a) It will be seen that it wholly abolishes incompetency, unless
the protection secured to marital communications be regarded as an
exception. In some respects this is a more sweeping change than
our own statutes have made, but our code is based upon the same
liberal idea, as will be seen by comparing the statutes of the two
states.
England took the initiatory step, in effecting the radical
change, in the competency and admissibility of witnesses, by the
passage of Lord Denmant's act, in 1843, as amended by Lord Bough-
ham's act of 1861. The first change in this state were to remove
the disqualification of interest, except in the case of parties
and those immediately interested, and to allow a party to be called
by an adverse party. (b)
------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Pub. St. Mass. c. 169, S.18; (b) Code 1848.
CHAPTER II.
PARTIES AND PERSONS INTERESTED.
Code Sec. 828.- Except as otherwise specially prescribed in
this title, a person shall not be excluded, or excused from being
a witness. (1) By reason of his or her interest in the event of an
action or special proceeding; or (2) because he or she is a party
thereto (3) the husband or wife of a party thereto, (4) of a person
in whose behalf an action or special proceeding in brought, pro-
secuted, opposed or defended.
Its effect and histor.- This makes use of the most general
and sweeping language. It is a radical change of the comn.on law
and abolishes its harsh rules of disqualification in this particular
class of cases, and makes the law on the subject statutory. In the
oases where the disqualification is still retained they may be
classed as exceptions to the general rule which will be discussed
in subsequent chapters. This section of the code was put in its
present form on 1876, and is a substitute for sec. 398 of the Code
of Pro.
It was enacted in 1847 chap. 462, that a party or person in
interest might be examined as a witness by his opponent: and the
same provision was incorporated in the Code of Procedure. The old
code as originally enacted, also provided that, no person offered
as a witness shall be excluded by reason of his interest in the
event of the action, but parties and persons for whose immediate
benefit the action was prosecuted or defended was especially except-
ed. In 1857 the legislative amended the 399th. sec. of the Code
of Procedure so as to read as follows: A party to en action may
be examined in his own behalf, the same as any other witness. The
amendment of 1857 did more than simply remove the objection of be-
0
ing a party. It affirmatively and positively malkes parties com-
petent witnesses so far as any objection based upon their relation
to the action is concerned. The statute not only makes parties
witnesses, but put them upon the same foot~ig as other witness sub-
ject to the same objections as other witnesses and none other. (a)
A mother in a bastard proceedings is not a competent witness
to prove relations with her husband, and is not brought within this
section, as she is not the wife of a party to the action or of a
person whose behalf the action or special proceeding was brought,
prosecuted opposed or defended. (b) The party to the action are
those who appear upon the record as such. (c)
By act of 1860 husband and wife were made competent witnesses,
the one for the other, or against the other in all cases where they
are parties to the action. (d) In such instances, they are subject
to the same rules of examination, except they are protected from
being required to disclose commnications between themselves. (e)
But this has been changed by act of 1867 chap. 887 so that either
is a competent witness in his or her behalf against the other, ex-
cept as excluded by sees. 829 & 831 of the code. And the husband
and wife can testify to conversations and communications (not con-
fidential) had with each other at any time prior to the taking
---------------------------------------------------------
(a) Marsh V. Potter, 30 Barb. 506; (b) People ex rel v. Supt. of
the poor 9 State Rep. 609; (c)Seeley v. Clark,78 N.Y.20; (d) Mat-
terson v. Ry.Co.62 Barb.364; (e) Wehrkamp v. Willett, 1 Keyes 250.
effect of the act of 1867.(a) The code does not confer upon the
court the power to compel a party to an action to submit his body
to an examination by a physician for the purpose of ascertaining
his physicial condition, and enabling him to testify to the %me
at the trial. (b) Nor in an action for personal injuries the
court has no power to compel the defendant to submit to a surgical
examination of his person.(c)
-------------------------- ----------------------------------
(a) Southwick v. Southwick, 49 N.Y. 511; (b) Newman v. Third Ave.
Rjr. Co., 50 Sup. Ct. 414; (c) McOmgan v. D. L. & W. Ry. Co. 129
N.Y. 50; Union P. Ry. Co. v. Boteford, 141 U.S. 250.
CHAPTER III.
PERSONAL TRANSACTION WITH
DECEASED PERSONS.
Code Civil Pro. 829.- Analytical statement of the section.
1. Upon
(a) the trial of an action or
(b) the hearing upon the merits of a special proceeding.
2. A (a) party or
(b) person interested in the event,
(a) or person from, through, or under whom such party or inter-
ested person derives his interest or title by assignmrent
or otherwise.
3. Shall not be examined as a witness
(a) in his own behalf or interest or
(b) on behalf of the party succeeding to his title or interest.
4. Against.
(a) the executor, administrator or survivor of a deceased per-
son, or
(b) the committee of a lunatic, or
(c) a person deriving his title or interest from, through, or
under a deceased person or lunatic by assignment or other-
wise.
5. Concerning
(a) a personal transaction or
(b) a communication between the witness and the deceased per-
son or lunatic.
6. Except where
(a) the executor, administrator, survivor, committee, or per-
son so deriving title or interest is examined on his own
behalf, or
(b) the testimony of the lunativ or deceased person is given
in evidence.
Concerning the same transaction or communication:
7. A person shall not be deemed interested for the purpose of
this section by reason of being a stockholder or officer
of any banking corporation which is a party to the action
or proceeding, or interested in the events thereof.
The above analysis is found in *Morrell on the Competency of
witnesses where most of the cases under this section, down to 1886
are collected.
Purpose of the section.- The purpose of the section is sim-
ply to exclude from the operation of section 828 this particular
class of evidence, this was intended to meet the problem, how to
prevent a surviving party from proving, by his own testimony a per-
sonal transaction or communication between himself and a deceased
person, which but for the prohibition he might do without fear, or
possibility of contradiction. (a) This purpose the statute attempts
to effectuate by rendering the survivor incompetent to testify as
a witness in such a case. But while the situation has in it the
possibility of injustice to the successor or to the estate of the
deceased, the disability in like manner has in it the possibility
of injustice to the survivor, and the turn of Judicial scale is
-----------------------------------------------------------
(a) Penny v. Orth, 88 N.Y. 451.
is made to depend upon the accident of death, an event beyond the
control of either party. This section which treats of this deli-
cate subject has been frequently varied in Its language, and around
it have grown up a large number of reported discussions.
Its applicatin.- The incompetency only applies upon the
trial of an action or the hearing upon the merits of a special pro-
ceeding, and has no application to interlocutory proceedings (a)
the test of interest of a witness not a party, is that he will
either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment,
or that the record be legal evidence for or against him in some
other action. (b) A mere interest arising from relationship, or
circumstances which might create a presumption that a witness would
be favorable towards a party, does not render the witness incompe-
tent. (c)
The next of kin, or heirs who will be benefited if a will is
not established, are incompetent witnesses for a contestant (d)
but the husbands of legatees under a will are not, disqualified by
the mere fact that they may become tenants by the courtesy through
their wives. (e)
An important exception, however, in testamentary matters, is
found in section 2644, by which the subscribing witnesses to a will
are rendered competent to testify in a probate court to its execu-
tion, however their interest may be affected. (f) A legatee,how-
ever, forfeits the legacy by becoming a subscribing witness. (g)
(a) Throop's notes; (b) Connelly v. O'Conner, 117 N.Y. 91; Eisin-
lord v. Clum, 126 N.Y. 552;(c) Nearpass v. Gilman, 104 N.Y. 506;
Sl Matter of Lakah, 31 State R.203; (e) Latter of Clark940 Hun 233
f Matter of Es"Yaman, 113 N.Y.62;(g)2 R.S.65 sec.50.
A predecessor in interest, through whom a party, ot interested per-
son claims, is disqualified to the same extent as the party himself.
This includes a grantor of land, (a) a vendoe of chattels (b) the
endorser of a note (c) the as-ignor of a mortgage. (d) Mullins v.
Chickering (e) is an interesting case on this point, and shows the
application of the statute. The plaintiff delivered to the de-
fendant a piano to be stored for her. The executor of plaintiff's
deceased husband claimed it as belonging to the testator's estate,
and on demand defendant delivered it to them. In an action for
conversion, it was held that the plaintiff as claiming title through
her husband, she was prohibited by section 829 from testifying in
her own behalf to any personal transaction between herself and her
husband, it being proved that the testator purchased the piano and
paid for it with his own money.
It is only when a party or person interested in the event, or
their predecessor in interest, is offered as a witness on his own
behalf or interest against the deceased, that he is disqualified.
It is always competent to call such a party, or person, to testify
against his interest. (f) A party cannot enable himself to testify
in a case otherwise prohibited by examining his adversary, and then
claiming that he is thus brought within the exception. (g)
------------------------- --------------------------------------
(a) Bookes v. Lansing, 13 Hun 38; (b) 6 Hun eSO; (c) Richardson v.
Warner, 13 Run 13; (d) Smith v. Cross, 90 N.Y. 549; (e) 110 N.Y.S13;
(f) 19 Hun 35; (g) Corning v. Walker, 100 N.Y.547; Miller v. Adkins,
9Hun 9.
The policy of the statute excludes the evidence of an inter-
ested witnesc, concerning
lot. Any transaction between himself and the deceased person,
or in which the witness in ar manner participated;
2d. All communications between the person deceased and the
witness, including communications in the presence or hearing of
the witness, if he in any way was a party thereto, or oomminmica-
tions to either one of two or more persons, if all were interested
(a) The evidence which renders the exception applicable must be
respecting the same transaction. It does not include written com-
munications between the witness and deceased, but it would preclude
the witness from testifying as to the writing, sending or receipt
of such communications. (b) But an interested witness may testify
to his own opinion as to the handwriting of the deceased. (c)
In the case of Nay v. Curley (d) which was an action to recover
for an alleged loan, plaintiff gave in evidence a check signed by
their intestate, payable to defendant and proved that it was de-
livered to, indorsed by and paid to him: they then called him as a
witness and proved by him that at the time of the delivery of the
check said intestate did not owe him any thing. As a witness in
his own behalf he wa= asked to state what took place between de-
cedent and himself. This was objected to and excluded as incompe-
tent under this section. It was held error and the court said,
that this provision did not abrogate the rule of evidence, that
-------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Holcomb V. Holcomb, 95 N.Y.316; (b) Matter of Budlong, 64 Hun
131; McKenna v. Bolger, 37 Hun 626; (c) Sirn-ons v. Havens, 101 N.Y
4037; (d) 113 N.Y.676.
where a party calls a witness and examines him as to part of a com-
munication or transaction, the other party may cal i out the whole,
so far as It bears upon or tends to explain the part called out;
that as the testimony of defendant called out by plaintiff tended
to rebut the presumption that the transaction was the payment of a
debt, and to raise the presumption that it was a loan, this opened
the whole transaction and entitled the defendant to testlly in his
own behalf respecting the same. (a)
------------------------ -------------------- ---------------
(a) Lewis v. Merritt, 98 N.Y. 208.
CHAPTER IV.
TESTIMONY OF PARTY ]DYING AFTER TRIAL.
Code Civil Pro. 830.- Analytical statement of the section.
1. Where a party has died since the trial of an action, or the
hearing upon the merits of a special proceeding,
(a) the testimony of the decedent or
(b) of any person who is rendered incompetent by the provis-
ions of section 829, taken or read in evidence at the
former trial or hearing, may be given or read in evidence
at a new trial or hearing by either party, subject to any,
(a) other legal objection to the competency of the witness or
(b) legal objection to his testimony or any question put to
him.
2. The testimony of any witness who has died or become insane
after a former trial or hearing of a contested proceeding.
A special proceeding or an action may be read upon a sub-
sequent trial or hearing, by any party to such action or
proceeding, subject to legal objection.
Meaning and construction.- This section renders the evidence
so taken, of persons who have become incompetent under section 829,
since the previous trial competent to be read in evidence. A strict
reading of the section would require the death of the party or in-
terested witness, in order to permit the reading of the previous
testimony, but in Morehouse v. Morehouse, (a) where the plaintiff
lost his mental powers, after the first trial, the section was held
-----------------------------------------------------------
(a) 41 Hun 146.
applicable. Nor is the section to be limited to the trial irmedi-
ately preceding; it applies to any former trial. (a) The section
mingles, somewhat obscurely, two distinct subjects.
1. The perpetuation of the testimony until a second trial, of a
party who was examined at, and had died since the former trial.
2. The establishment of the competency on the second trial of the
testimony of a witness taken at a former trial, who is living at
the second trial, but is precluded by section 829 from testifying
at the latter by the circumstances of the death, between the trials,
of a person against whose successor in interest, his testimony
would be offered to a personal transaction or communication with
the decedent. (b)
The section is remedial and should be liberally construed.
It renders competent.
1. The testimony of a party given upon a former trial, in case
such party has since died.
2. The testimony given on the former trial of any person, who
since then has become incompetent to be examined on this trial by
virtue of section 820. (c)
Its application.- It must not be a different action; thus,
where the plaintiff's testator, having been injured while in the
employment of defendant, brought an action for damages, in which
he was examined as a witness on his own behalf, before the trial.
Defendant appeared and cross-examined him. While the action was
pending testator died, and therefore this action was brought by
(a) Koehler v. Scheider, 31 State R.64; (b) Matter of Budlong 54
Hun 136; (c) Morehouse v. Morehouse, 41 Hun 146
plaintiff, his executor, to recover the damages occasioned to the
widow and next of kin of the deceased by his death. It was held
that the deposition of the deceased taken in the first action,
oould not, against the defendant's objection, be read in evidence
upon the trial of this action. (a) The testimony may be read in
evidence by the stenographer who took it down at the former trial,
(b) but it must appear that what is offered in the whole testimony
given. Reading from an appeal book simply which was made from a
settlement of the case, is not sufficient. (a)
The rule permitting evidence of a deceased to be read is re-
strioted to cases where the parties were the same, or in privity
with those in the action or proceeding in which the witness was
sworn and examined. (d) That the first action was by default and
the defendant did not cross-examine the witness does not make the
evidence of the plaintiff who has died meantime incompetent on a
subsequent trial, for the defendant had the power to appear and
examine, and his failure to do so was a waiver of that privilege.
(e) The deposition of a party taken before trial at the instance
of his adversary is admissible upon the trial, notwithstanding the
decease of such adversary before the trial. (f) If the jury on the
former trial disagree, there has still been a trial within this
section. (g)
(a) Murphy v. N.Y.C. & H.R.R.R.Co. 31 lun.358.; (b) Lawson v. Jones,
61 How Pr. 424; (c) Odell v. Solomon, 16 St. Rep. 577; (d) Vail v.
Cragg, 13 St. Rep. 448; (e) Bradley v. Merick, 91 N.Y.293; (f) Rice
v) Mottey, 24 HUn 143; (g) Lawson v. Jones, 61 How Pr.424.
CHAPTER V.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Code Civil Pro. 831.- Analytical statement of the section.
1. A husband or wife is not competent to testify against the
other, upon the trial of an action, or the hearing upon the merits
of a special prooeeding, founded upon an allegation of adultery,
except to prove the marriage or disprove the allegation of adultery.
2. A husband or wife shall not be compelled, or without the con-
sent of the other if living, allowed to disclose a confidential
comunication made by one to the other during marriage.
3. In an action for criminal conversation, the plaintiff's wife
is not a competent witness for the plaintiff, but she is a compe-
tent witness for the defendant, as to any matter in controversy;
except that she cannot, without the plaintiff's consent, disclose
any confidential communication had or made between herself and the
plaintiff.
History and application of the section.- The first part of
this section was taken substantially from sections two and three
of the laws of 1867 chap. 887, that last part of the section is
simular to chap. 426 of the laws of 1876, and is the same as chap.
416 of the laws of 1877 with the exception that the words,"not a
competent witness for the plaintiff,."but she was inserted by the
amendment of 1880 chap. 149. At common law a husband or wife could
not be a witness for or against each other. The reason given for
the was the unreliability of the evidence of the witness arising
from mutual interest and partiality, and a general policy of pre-
serving the harmony of the domestic relations. (a) The modern
tendency here, as elsewhere, is to refer such considerations to
the weight and force of the evidence, rather than to its competen-
cy. A husband and wife are, under the Code, competent to testify
either for or against each other in all civil actions (b) except
in the cases mentioned. This section does not apply to persons
cohabiting as husband and wife, but not married. (c)
Adultery.- The disproof of the adultery is not limited to a
mere denial. A husband or wife are competent to give all testi-
mony that may have a material effect in convincing or persuading
the mind of a judge or jury, either directly or by necessary in-
ference, that the allegation of adultery is untrue. (d) The par-
ties are not competent to prove the fact of a prior marriage. (e)
It does not effect their competency as a witness in the other's
favor, either is competent in favor of the others. (f) In the case
of DeMali v. DeMali,(g) which was an action by a wife against her
husband for illegal and inhuman treatment, the defendant by way of
construction, alleged that plaintiff had committed adultery and
asked for a divorce. It was held that the action was not founded
upon an allegation of adultery within the meaning of this section
and her testimony denying the allegations of defendant's counter-
claim was admissible that the defendant could not by setting up
the counterclaim deprive plaintiff of the right to testify.
(a) Marsh v. Potter, 30 Barb. 506; (b) Southwick v. Southwiuk,49
N.Y. 510; (c) Dennis v. Crittenden, 42 N.Y.642; (d) Irsch v. Irsch
12 Civ. Pro. 181; (f) Bailey v. Bailey, 3 N.Y. St.Rep. 132; (e) Finn
v. Finn 12 Hun 339; (g) 120 N.Y. 485.
In an action to recover damages for seducing and debauching
of plaintiff's wife, the plaintiff Is a competent witness to prove
any fact tending to establish the charge of misconduct, although
it may implicate her in the transaction, this section applies only
when the wife is a party to the action. (a) The Code does not
limit the evidence to a denial simply, but gives the right gener-
ally 'to disprove the allegation of Adultery,sto show that the
allegation is not true and that the defendant could not only deny,
but could testify to any fact or circumstances within the parties
knowledge, competent and material on the question as to whether
the act as charged was committed. (b)
Confidential communications.- The object of this rule is that
the most entire confidence may exist between husband and wife, and
that there may be no apprehension that such confidence can at any
time, or in any event, be violated, so far at least as regards any
testimony or disclosure in a court of justice. (c)
The question as to what constitutes a confidential communica-
tion, or whether all communications between husband and wife are
confidential, was touched upon in Parkhurst v. Berdeli, (d) where
Earl, J., expressed the opinion that all communications between
husband and wife, when alone, are not confidential, and limits the
communication between husband and wife which are privileged by the
statute to such 'as are expressly made confidential, or such as are
of a confidential nature, or induced by the marital relation.'
~----------------------------------------------------------
(a) Wood v. Glenhill, 66 Hun 220; (b) Stevens v. Stevens, 54 Hun
490; (c) Chamberlain v. The People,23 N.Y.89; (d) 110 N.Y.393.
In that case it was held that it was competent to examine the wife
of the defendant as to statements made by him to her, in reference
to certain business liabilities sought to be fastened upon him.
As the law was prior to 1867 it embraced husband and wife, but by
that act it was limited to confidential commnications. Such tes-
timony of the wife cannot be used against the husband after the
dissolution of the marriage contract, whether by death or divorce.
(a) Though a co-nunication received or facts learned after divorce,
may be testified to, and she may also be admitted to testify to
facts which came to her knowledge by means equally accessible to
any person not standing in that relation. (b)
This subject also belongs to privileged communications, and
are therefore protected independently of the ground of interest and
identity, which precludes the parties from testifying for or against
each other. The happiness of the married state requires that there
should be the most unlimited confidence between husband and wife;
and this confidence the law secures by providing that it shall be
kept forever inviolable; that nothing shall be extracted from the
bosam of the wife which was confided there by the husband. (c)
Criminal conversation.- In such an action the wife is not a
competent witness for her husband to prove the charge if no divorce
has been obtained. (d) Though she is after a divorce a vinculo (e)
the section does not apply to actions where a husband seeks to re-
cover damages for alienation of the wife affections. (f)
---------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Southwick v. Southwick,49 N.Y.510; (b) O'Conner v. Majoribanks,
5 Scott N.R. 394; (c) 1 Greenleaf sec.254; (d) Carpenter v. White,
46 Barb. 391; (e) Retcliffe v. Wales, 1 Hill 63; (f) Smith v.
O'Btine,24 St. Rep.708.
CHAPTER VI.
CONVICTION FOR CRIME.
Code Civil Pro. 832.- A person who has been convicted of a
crime or misdemeanor is, notwithstanding, a competent witness in a
civil or criminal action or special proceeding; but the conviction
may be proved for the purpose of affecting the weight of his testi-
mony, either by the record, or by his cross-examination, upon which
he must answer any question relevant to that inquiry; and the party
cross-examining him is not concluded by his answer to such a ques-
tion.
Common Law and Code Copaired.- This provision of the Code
is new and was introduced into it in 1876, chap.448 sec.832. It
was amended by laws of 1879 chap. 542 by adding the words,"in a
civil or criminal action or special proceeding." (a) This section
is directly contrary to the law as it stood before, which was in
effect, that a person who was sentenced for felony should not be
competent to testify in any cause civil or criminal unless he Tas
pardoned by the governor or the legislature. (b) The design and
effect of the section is to establish a uniform rule, and permit
the oonviction for any crime to be proved, and whether it will
affect the credibility of the witness is a question for the jury.
(c) The exclusion of felons as witnesses at common law was justi-
fied by the argument that their testimony was wholly unreliable and
unsafe, and that their exclusion as witnesses was a proper punish-
ment for their crimes. (d) A conviction and sentence for a miede-
(a) See Penal Code Sec. 714; (b) People v. McGloin, 28 Hun 150;
(c) People v. Burns, 33 Hun 298; (d) Throop's Notes.
meanor never disqualified, but only for a felony. Accordingly a
conviction for peti larceny, that not being a felony, did not dis-
qualify.(a) But conviction for a misdemeanor wac always, both at
oomnon law and under the Revised Statute, and is now, admissible
for the purpose of affecting the credibility of the witness. (b)
Application of the section.- The general rule is, that a par-
ty who, upon cross-examination, asks questions relating to matters
not directly within the issue for the purpose of affecting the cred-
ibility of the witness, cannot contradict what the witness says in
reply, by other witnesses. The necessity for this rule arises from
the confusion which would arise from permitting parties to bring in-
to the trial of one issue, matters which are wholly collateral. But
to this salutary rule the law permits an exception in the case of
conviction for crime. If the witness on cross-examination denies
that he has been convicted of crime, although that is a matter whol-
ly collateral to the issue being tried, it is permissible to prove
the conviction under the provisions of this section.
Nothing short of conviction can be proved for the purpose of
affecting the witness' testimony. He cannot be asked whether he has
been arrested upon a criminal charge,(c) or how many times he has
been arrested,(d) or whether he has been indicted. (e) Conviction
means the final judgment of the court in passing sentence. (f)
(a) Shay v. People, 22 N.Y. 317; (b) 29 Hun 122, 382; 33 Hun 296;
Morrell on Comp. of Wit., p. 81. (c) People v. Crapo, 78 N.Y. 238;
(d) People v. Brown, 72 N.Y. 671; (e) Ryan v. People, 79 N.Y. 593;
(f) Sacia v. Decker, 10 Daly 204.
A judgment in a civil action to recover a fine, is not a convic-
tion of a crime or misdemeanor, and is not admissible to affect
the weight of the testimony of the person against whom it was ren-
dered, given in another action. (a) A person convicted is render-
ed competent whether sentenced or not. (b)
-------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Arhart v. Stark, 57 State Rep. 830; (b) People v. McGloin, 91
N.Y. 241.
CHAPTER VII.
PROFESSIONAL COMMU1I CATIONS.
I CLERGYMAN.
Code Civil Pro. 833.- A clergyman, or other minister of any
religion, shall not be allowed to disolose a confession made to
him, in his professional character, in the course of discipline,
enjoined by the rules or practice of the religious body, to which
he belongs.
Common Law Rule and A plication.- In the comnon law of evi-
dence there is no distinction between clergyman and layman; but all
confessions and other matters not confided to legal counsel, must
be disclosed when required for the purpose of justice. Neither con-
fessions made to a minister or to a member of the party's own church
nor secrets confided to a Roman Catholic priest in the course of
confession are regarded as privileged communications, but this was
not the rule of the Cicil Law nor that of Scotland. (a)
This section is based on the provisions of the Revised Statute,
and the instances in which it has been invoked are very rare. Only
one reported case Is to be found, that of People v. Gates, (b) and
in that case, which was of a criminal nature the clerglman testifi-
ed that the confession was made to him as a clergyman, and not in
a professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by
his church, and he was held competent to testify. The provisions
of this section applyto any examination of a person as a witness,
unless they are expressly waived upon the trial or examination by
the jerson confessing (c)
(a) Vol. 1 Greenleaf 247; (b) 3 Wend. 312; (c) Code Civ. Pro.336.
II. PHYSICIANS.
Oode CivilPro. 834.- A person, duly authorized to practice
physic or surgery, shall not be allowed to disclose any information
which he acquired in attending a patient, in a professional capac-
ity, and which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity.
Comon Law.- At common law there is no protection extended
to medical persons, in regard to information which they have ac-
quired confidentially, by attending in their professional character,
but in a number of the states the rule has been changed by statute
to protect a patient in regard to information which his physician
has acquired from him confidentially, in the course of the treat-
ment of his illness. (a)
Purpose of the section.- This provision of the Code is a
substantial re-enactment of a simular provision contained in the
Revised Statute. It places the information of the physician ob-
tained from his patient in a professional way, substantially on the
same footing with the information obtained by an attorney, profes-
sionally of his client's affairs. Its plain purpose seems to be,
to enable the patient to make known his condition to his physician,
without the danger of any disclosure by him which would annoy the
feelings, damage the character, or impair the standing of the pa-
tient while living or disgrace his memory when dead,(a) that the
person may feel sure that whatever they disclose to a physician in
his professional capacity, in regard to their bodily condition,
whether it be by word or by allowing a physicial examination, shall
------------------------- ---------- -------------------------
(a) Pierson v. People, 79 N.Y.424.
be held sacred, whenever the relation of physician and patient ex-
ists. (a)
Interpretation.- The words win a professional capacityu,
have reference to the relation between the parties and whether the
physician in employed or not it makes no difference if he acts in
that capacity and the relation is shown to exist. It is iznreter-
lal how the physician obtained that information, whether by obser-
vations or word of mouth it is Plike privileged to the extent to
which it bears upon the professional relation and to that only.(b)
A recent revier of the question presented by this section and of
the authorities, by Mr. Austin Abbott, will be found in the Colum-
bia Law Times.(c)
Where a party seeks to exclude the testimony of a physician,
the burden is upon such party to bring the case within the provis-
ion; he must make it appear not only that the information which he
seeks to exclude was acquired by the witness in attending the pa-
tient in a professional capacity, but also that it was necessary
to enable him to act in that capacity. (d)
Waiver of the Privilege.- This section applies to any ex-
amination of a person as a witness unless the provisions thereof L
are expressly waived upon the trial or examination by the patient.
(e) The seal of confidence impressed by the statute, is for the
benefit of the patient and may be removed by him or with his con-
sent, but no one but the patient can waive the privilege (f) the
(a) Grattan v. Met. Life Ins. Co.,80 N.Y. 281; (b) People v. Murpht
101 N.Y. 126; Westover v. A. L. Ins. Co., 99 N.Y. 56; Renihan v.
Dennin, 103 N.Y. 573. (c) Vol. 5 p. 181. (d) People v. Schuyler,
106 N.Y. 298. (e) Code Civ. Pro. 836. (f) 71estover v. A. L. Ins.
Co. PC N.Y. 56.
seal remains after the death of the patient, and the personal rep-
resentatives could make objection to evidence forbidden by the
statute and even an assignee may exercise it. (a) If the patient
waives the privilege the physician cannot object to being examined
as the privilege is that of the patient and not of the physician.
It does not prevent a physician from testifying upon a trial for
murder as to the condition of the person injured whom he attended
befol d ath ensued. (b)
A physician or surgeon may upon a trial or examination dis-
close any information as to the mental or physicial condition of a
patient who is deceased, which he acquired in attending such pa-
tients professionally, except confidential corimunications and such
facts as would tend to disgrace the memory of the patient, when the
privilege has been expressly waived on such trial or examination by
the personal representatives of the deceased patient, or if the va-
lidity of the last will and testament of such deceased patient is
in question, by the executor or executors named in said will, or
the surviving husband, widow or any heir-at-law or any of the next
of kin, of such deceased or any other party in interest. (c) This
provision was enacted to remedy the decision in the case of West-
over v. A. L. Ins. Co.,(d) in which it was held, that upon the
death of the patient the privilege of waiver ceased, and his exec-
utors or administrators could not exercise it, this additional pro-
vision was made in 1891. A decedent expressly waives the privilege,
------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Egington v. Mut. L Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 185. (b) Pierson v. People,
79 N.Y. 424. (c) Code Civil Pro. 836. (d) 99 N.Y. 60.
if he requests a physician to become a witness to his will, as he
is legal effect, requests the physician to testify to the whole
truth within his knowledge touching the matter material to be in-
quired of in order to establish the probate of the will. (a)
It is provided by the amendment of 1893 to the Code section
836, that in an action to recover for personal injury the testimony
of a physician or surgeon attached to any hospital, dispensary or
other charitable institution as to information which he acquired in
attending a patient in a professional capacity, at such hospital,
dispensary, or other charitable institution shall be taken before
a referee appointed by-a judge of the court in which such action is
pending; provided, however, that any judge of such court at any
time in his discretion may notwithstanding such deposition, order
that a subpoena issue for the attendance and examination of such
physician or surgeon upon the trial of the action. The courts have
not construed this part of the section. It seems to be plain upon
its face, and simply provides a method of taking this particular
class of testimony in this particular class of cases, which is nec-
essarily very limited in its application.
(a) Matter of Freeman, 12 St Rep. 175.
III. ATTORNEY AND COUNSELLOR.
At Common Law.- Professional communications between attorney
and client was privileged to its fullest extent at corron law, the
rule was based upon public policy and the confidential counsellor,
solicitor, or attorney of the party could not be compelled to dis-
close papers delivered or communications made to him, or letters
or entries made by him in that capacity, or other matters which
they knew only through their professional relation to the client,
they were not only justified in withholding such matters, but were
bound to withhold them, and would not be compelled to disclose the
information, or produce the papers in any court of law or equity,
either as a party or as witness. (a) The earliest reported ease
on this subject is that of Bird v. Lovelace, (b) which firmly es-
tablishes this rule. Chancellor Brougham in the case of Greenough
v. Gaskill, said 'the foundation of this rule is not on account of
any particular importance which the law attributes to the business
of legal professors, or any particular disposition to afford them
protection. But it is out of regard to the to the interests of
justice, which cannot go on, without the aid of men skilled in
jurisprudence, in the practice of the courts, and in those matters
affecting rights and obligations, which form the subject of all
judicial proceedings. If such communications were not protected,
no man, as the same learned judge remarked in another case, would
dare to consult a professional adviser, with a view to his defense,
or to the enforcement of his rights; and no man could safely come
(a)
Greenough v. Gaskell, 1 My & K. 101 Vol; 1 Greenleaf sec. 237.
(b) 19 Eliz. in Chancery Cary's Rep. :38.
into a court, either to obtain redress, or to defend himself. (a)
Code Civil Pro. 835.- An attorney or counsellor-at-law shall
not be allowed to disclose a communication, made by his client to
him, or his advise given thereon, in the course of his professional
employment.
Extent and Application.- This section is taken substantially
from the Code of Civil Pro. of 1850, which incorporated the cor,=on
law rule upon the subject into the statute. It was a mere re-
enactment of the common law and not intended to change or enlarge
that rule as it has been expounded by the courts. The protection
afforded to a client by this rule does not cease with his deeth,
but may be invoked by his personal representatives. The object is
to enable and encourage persons needing professional advise to dis-
close freely the facts to which they seek advise without fear that
such facts will be made pTublic to their disgrace or detriment by
their attorney. It is plain that the privilege sec'nred by this
runle of law does not apply to a case where two ore more persons
consutl an attorney for their mutual benefit, that it cannot be in-
voked in any litigation which may thereafter arise between such
persons or their representatives, but can be in a litigation be-
tween them and a stranger.(b)
One who objects to the testimony must prove that the comrnuni-
cation was made to the attorney in the course of professional em-
ployment. (c) A communication made after the relation has ceased
is not protected. (d) Before the section will apply a contract
---------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Bolton v. Corp. of Liverpool, 1 My & K. 04. (b) Hurlburt v.
Hurlburt, 123 N.Y. 420. (c) Mowell v. VanBuren, 28 N.Y. Supp. 1035
(d) Yordam v. Hi,,, 13 John 4.2.
relation between attorney and client must exist based upon an em-
ployment by the client. (a) The fact that the advice is gratui-
tous makes no difference, the advise need not relate to a suit pend-
Ing or contemplated. The privilege is that of the client and not
of the attorney. It cannot be admitted in a litigation between
third parties, and the party against whom it is offered may object
on ground of public policy. (b)
A request by testator to an attorney to draw his will, and
sign it as an attesting witness, is a waiver of the obligation of
secrecy, and hence such attorney is competent to testify to the
execution of the will when it is propounded for probate. (c) When
the probate of a will is contested on the ground of fraud, forgery,
or mistake, instructions for the making of the will, received by
an attorney, are not privileged communications within any just and
proper construction or understanding of the rule of law relating
to them. (d)
An attorney cannot be compelled to produce a deed or other
instrument intrusted to him by his client, nor to disclose its
date or contents, but he may be called to prove its existance, and
that it is in his possession, (e) this privilege extends to both
counsel and client. (f4 The attorney may testify as to the client,;
handwriting, the privilege does not extend to information derived
(a) Renihan v. Dennin, 10 N.Y. 573. (b) Bacon v. Frisbie, 80 N.Y.
394. (c) In re Gagan's Will, 21 N.Y. Supple. 350 affi'g 47 State
Rep. 444; 20 N.Y. Supple. 426. (d) Matter of Chapman, 27 Hun 673.
(e) Brandt v. Klien, 17 Johns 335. (f) Carnes v. Platt, 15 Abb.
N. S. 337.
from third persons or other sources, although they are obtained
while acting as such attorney, (a)
This rule of law does not shield a crime, thus if an attorney
is consulted as to the coimyunication of a crime which is malutm in
se it is not privileged. (b) A complete analysis of the law on
this subject in a nut shell may be found in Art. 156 of Chases
Stephens on Evidence.
Clerks and Others.- Communications made by a client or by
any third person acting as his agent or friend, with the view of
establishing the relation and securing professional advise or as-
sistance, made to the clerk or agent of the attorney to be com-
municated to him are privileged, but will not be extended to com-
munications made by a defendant to the clerk of a law firm, who,
being asked if he was a lawyer, replied that he was not and to whom
the communications were made without further inquiry or suggestion.
In other words an interpreter, intermediary, agent or clerk of an
attorney through whom communications are made stands upon the same
footing as his principal, and will not be allowed to divulge any
fact coming to his knowledge as the conduct of information between
the attorney and his client, but the rule extends no further than
this. It is confined to communications between the attorney and
his client and extends to the necessary organs by which such commu-
nications are made, but no further. (c)
(a) Crosby v. Berger, 11 Paige 377. (b) Bank of Utica v. Merserean
3 Barb. Ch. 528. (c) Greenleaf Vol 1 sec. 239; Hawes v. State 88
Ala. 37.
A communication made to the attorney's clerk to enable him to draw
a complaint in the clients action is privileged. (a)
Waiver and Limitation.- But nothing herein contained shall
be construed to disqualify an attorney in the rrobate of a will
heretofore executed or offered for probate or hereafter to be ex-
ecuted or offered for probate from becoming a witness, as to its
preparation and executton in case such attorney is one of the sub-
scribing witnesses there to. (b)
The section applies to any examination of a person as a wit-
ness unless the provisions thereof are expressly waived upon the
trial or examination by the client. Prior to 1877 the law did
not require the privilege to be expressly waived. An examination
of the attorney as to such communications by the party himself is
to be considered a sufficient waiver, this privilege cannot be
waived by the personal representatives as in the case of communica-
tions made to a physician, but this express waiver may be inferred
from conduct. (o) The seal of confidence is not the seal of the
attorney, but of the client, it remains forever unless removed by
the party himself in whose favor it has been placed, and where the
privilege belongs to several clents, any one of them, or a majotity
cannot waive the protection. (d)
(a) Sibley v. Waffle, 16 N.Y. 180i Brand v. Brand, 39 How. Pr. 193.
(b) Code Cicil Pro. 836. (c) 1atter of Coleman, 111 N.Y. 220.
(d) Bank of Utica v. Merserean, 3 Barb. Ch. 596.
CHAPTER VIII.
SANCTION OF AN OATH.
At Common Law.- One of the main provisions of the law for
securing the purity and truth of oral evidence is that it be de-
livered under the sanction of an oath. Persons not believing in
the existence of a God who will punish false swearing are incompe-
tent witnesses by the common law. (a) Atheists, therefore, and
all infidels, that is, those who profess no religion that can bind
their consciences to speak truth are rejected as incompetent to
testify. (b) The administration of an oath supposes that a moral
and religious accountability is felt to a Supreme Being, and this
is the sanction which the law requires upon the conscience, before
it admits him to testifyi The design of the oath is not to call
the attention of God to man; but the attention of man to God; not
to call on Him to punish the wrong-doer; but on man to remember
that He will. Accordingly, an oath has been well refined, to be
"an outward pledge given by the witness or person taking it, that
his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his
responsibility to God'. A security to this extent, for the truth
of testimony, is all that the law seems to have deemed necessary;
and with less security than this, is believed that the purposes of
justice cannot be accomplished. (a)
Manner of Adninistering an Oath.- All witnesses are to be
sworn according to the peculiar ceremonies of their own religion,
or in such a manner as they may deem binding on their own conscience
--------------- -----------------------------------------------
(a) Blair v. Seaver, 26 Pa. S. 274. (b) 1 Stark Ev. W. (c) Green-
leaf Vol. 1 sec. 328.
If the witness is not of the Christian religion, the court will
inquire as to the form in which an oath is administered in his own
country, or among those of his own faith, and will impose it in
that form. And if, being a Christian, he has conscientious scru-
ples against taking an oath in the usual form, he will be allowed
to make a solemn religious asseveration, involving a like appeal
to God for the truth of his testimony, in any mode which he shall
declare to be binding on his conscience. (a)
Code Civil Pro. 845-51.- The usual mode of administrating
an oath, now practiced, by the person who swears laying his hand
upon and kissing the gospels, must be observed, where an oath is
administered, except as otherwise specially prescribed in this
article.
The oath must be administered in the following form, to a per-
son who so desires, the laying of the hand upon and kissing the
gospels being omitted. IYou do swear, in the presence of the ever-
lasting Godw. While so swearing, he may or may not hold up his
hands, at his option.
A solemn declaration or affirmation, in the following form,
must be administered to a person who declares that he was consci-
entious scruples against taking an oath, or swearing in any form:
"You do solemnly, sincerely, and truly, declare and affirmu.
If the court or officer, before which or rhom a person is
offered as a witness, is satisfied, that any peculiar mode of
swearing, in lieu of, or in addition to laying the hand upon and
kissing the gospels, is, in his opinion, more solemn and obliga-
-----------------------------------------------------------
(a) Omichand v. Baker, 1 Atk. 21,46.
tory, the court or officer may, in its or his discretion, adopt
that mode of swearing the witness.
A person believing in a religion, other than the Christian,
may be sworn according to the peculiar ceremonies, if any, of his
religion, instead of as prescribed above.
The court or officer may examine an infant, or a person appar-
ently of weak intellect, produced before it or him, as a witness,
to ascertain his capacity and the extent of his knowledge; and may
inquire of a person, produced as a witness, what peculiar ceremo-
nies in swearing he deems most obligatory.
A person swearing, affirming or declaring, in any form, where
an oath is authorized by law, is lawfully sworn, and is guilty of
perjury, in a case where he would be guilty of the same crime, if
he had sworn by laying his hand upon and kissing the gospels.
Effect and Application.- These sections are taken substan-
tially from sections 84-90 of II Revised Statute 407-8, with a
very few slight modifications, the majority of these provisions,
it will be seen is simply declaratory of the common law, in so far
as they apply to the manner of swearing those who believe in the
Christian faith, therefore the decisions which have been based
upon common law principles, are apllicable to that extent to these
sections of the Code. But the statute removes the common law dis-
qualification of those who do not so believe, and allows them to
take a solemn declaration, or affirmation as a substitute for an
oath upon the gospels.
It is a general rule that the witness must not be examined as
to his religious belief, the want of such belief must be establish-
ed by other means, as declarations previously made to others etc.
(a) But in this state where atheism mo longer disqualifies, it may
nevertheless be shown to affect the witness's credit. (b) To con-
stitute a valid oath for the falsity of which perjury will lie,
these must be a present unequivocal act in the presence of an au-
thorized officer to administer the same, by which the affiant con-
sciously takes upon himself the oblication, therefore the mere de-
livery of an affidavit, signed by the person presenting it, to an
officer for his certificate, is not such an act. Nor where the
delivery is affected through the agency of the third party. (c)
It is held to be complied with, when the oath is administered ei-
ther upon the Evangelists, the New Testament, or the Scriptures or
Bible. (d) An oath administered upon a book supposed by the parties
to have been the Bible is a valid oath, and a person is as amenable
to an indictment for perjury as if he had sworn on the gospels.
If the party taking the oath makes no objection to the mode of ad-
ministering it at the time he is deemed to have arnsented to the
particular form adopted. (e)
Where a witness called to testify is of tender years, the
party against whom he is called may require that he shall be ex-
amined as to his understanding of the nature and obligation of an
oath. (f)
----------------------------- --------------------- --------------
(a) Com. v. Smith, 2 Gray 516. (b) Stanbro v. Hopkins, 28 Barb. 265.
(c) O'Reilly v. People, 86 N.Y. 11. (d) Tuttle v. People, 36 N.Y.
436. (e) People v. Cook, 8 N.Y. 84. (f) People v. McNair, 21 Wend.
608.
In the case of People v. Frindal,(a) where the defendant was in-
dicted for assault in the first degree. A child of eight years
was called by the defendant as a witness, and he showed from his
testimony that he had no apprehencion of the nature of an oath.
The court held on appeal that the rejection of receiving the un-
sworn statement of the witness for what it was worth, at the trial
court was proper. And the court said; the law requires the testi-
mony of witnesses to be given under the sanctity of an oath: and
where a child is of such tender years as not to be able to com-
prehend the nature of an oath, it seems to us that the safeguards
which the law has placed around human testimony would be entirely
overthrown, were such statements permitted to be given. (a)
(a) 58 Hun 482.
CHAPTER IX.
MENTAL DISQUALIFICATION.
General Principles.- Upon the subject of insufficient under-
standing the Code is silent, therefore the comnon law rules on the
subject must govern. It makes no difference from what cause this
defect of understanding may have arisen; nor whether it be tempor-
ary and curable, or permanent; whether the party be hopelessly an
idiot, or maniac, or only occasionally insane, an a lunatic; or be
intoxicated; or whether the defect arises from mere imaturity of
intellect, as in the case of children. While the deficiency of
understanding exist, be the cause of what nature soever, the person
is not admissible to be sworn as a witness. But if the cause be
temporary, and a lucid interval should occur, or a cure be affected,
the competency also is restored. (a)
The Test.- That a witness is a lunatic, it is not enough
per se to exclude him, but he must at the time of his examination
be so under the influence of his malady as to be deprived of that
"share of understanding~which is necessary to enable him to retain
in memory the events of which he has been witness, and gives him a
knowledge of right and wrong. If at the time of his examination
he hE.s this share of understanding, he is competent. That is the
test of competency and of such competency the court is the judge:
whilst the weight of the testimony-the credit to be attached to
it-is left to the jury. (b)
---------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Greehleaf sec. 365; Livingston v. Kiersted, 10 John 362.
(b) Coleman v. Com. 25 Grat. (Va) 885.
Deaf hgCtea.- Persons who could neither hear or talk, at
early common law was classed as idiots and hold to be incompetent
as witnesses. (a) In view, of the fact that modern science has
discovered a way of educating these unfortunate persons, who have
been found to be of much greater intelligence than was anciently
supposed the rule has been changed. Sufficient understanding
being shown, such persons may be sworn and give his testimony
through an interpreter, or in writing if he is able to do so. (b)
----------------------------------------------------------
(a) 1 Hale P. 0. 34. (b) Rapalje on Witnesses see. 6.
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